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Abstract
Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in most labor
market models all workers have the same probability of being hired. We argue that
selective hiring crucially a¤ects welfare analysis. We set up a model that is isomorphic
to a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selective
hiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but implications for
welfare are di¤erent for two reasons. First, a hiring externality occurs with random
but not with selective hiring. Second, the welfare costs of unemployment are much
larger with selective hiring, because unemployment risk is distributed unequally across
workers.
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1 Introduction
Standard search and matching models of the labor market often assume, for tractability, that
workers are homogeneous and markets are complete. Combined, these assumptions eliminate
an important source of welfare costs of unemployment: the fact that unemployment is un-
equally distributed across workers. In studies doing welfare analysis, the focus has been
on relaxing the complete markets assumption. If markets are incomplete, ex-ante identical
workers cannot share unemployment risk, making these workers heterogeneous ex post. Be-
cause one needs to keep track of the entire distribution of asset holdings, this class of models
is di¢ cult to solve. Moreover, because workers are ex ante homogeneous, welfare costs of
unemployment are small (Krusell and Smith 1998).
We propose a framework, in which workers are ex-ante heterogeneous, while maintaining
the assumption that markets are complete. In this model, some workers are more attractive
to employers than others because they have lower training costs.1 Individual-specic training
costs are fully observable to workers and rms and determine how likely it is that a worker
nds a job in a given period. We analyze two polar cases in this framework. If individual
training costs are transitory or fully match-specic, each worker has the same probability of
being hired in future periods in expectation. We call this version of the model the case of
perfectly random hiring. If individual training costs are permanent or fully worker-specic,
the probability of being hired in the future depends on current training costs, which will be
the same in future periods. This is the case of perfectly selective hiring.2
If training costs have both a transitory (match-specic) and a permanent (worker-specic)
component, then hiring is partly random and partly selective. There is ample evidence that
hiring decision in the real world are partly selective, and not all workers have the same
probability of nding a job. We discuss some of this evidence in section 2. By analyzing
the polar cases of perfectly random and perfectly selective hiring, we aim to understand how
selectivity in hiring decision matters for our understanding of the labor market.
Our model is set up in such a way that it is isomorphic to a standard search and matching
model (Pissarides 2000, chapter 1) in terms of its predictions for labor market dynamics.
Specically, the model can be parameterized to generate the same aggregate job-nding and
unemployment rates, and the same elasticities of these variables with respect to changes
in productivity. The distribution of idiosyncratic training costs plays the same role as the
aggregate matching function in the standard model. Thus, we provide a framework that on
the one hand maintains most of the insights from standard labor market models, and on the
other hand allows us to compare the predictions of the model under selective versus random
hiring. While the predictions of the model for aggregate variables are identical under selective
hiring, the implications for inequality and welfare are very di¤erent.
If hiring is selective, unemployment is costly because unemployment risk is spread un-
equally across workers. With perfectly selective hiring, some workers are always employed,
while others are always unemployed. With partially selective hiring all workers are employ-
1Training costs are a convenient way to introduce heterogeneity in the context of our model. However,
other sources of heterogeneity, in particular heterogeneity in productivity, have very similar implications, see
section 7 and appendix A.3.
2This concept of selectivity in hiring is similar to Berger (2016), although in that paper rms are selective
in their ring rather than hiring decisions, ring bad workers and maintaining good ones.
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able, but some more so than others. Thus, unemployment risk is uninsurable and the welfare
costs of unemployment are much larger than under random hiring. This e¤ect is counteracted
by a hiring externality, which leads to overhiring with random but not with selective hiring.
Quantitatively, the distributional e¤ect dominates the hiring externality. As a result, there
is a role for government intervention, insuring (unborn) workers against their unemployment
risk.
As an application of our framework, we study the question of the optimal level of un-
employment insurance. Under random hiring, the government can replicate the e¢ cient
allocation using unemployment benets and lump-sum taxes. In this case, unemployment
benets are set to make sure the level of job creation is e¢ cient. Under selective hiring
there is an additional motive for unemployment insurance because workers cannot self-insure
against their characteristics, which determine their individual-specic unemployment risk.
Thus, the government faces a trade-o¤ between e¢ cient job creation and e¢ cient redistrib-
ution. We solve the Ramsey problem for the government in this case and nd two results.
First, the maximum welfare that can be reached under selective hiring is substantially lower
than under random hiring. Second, to obtain a more equitable income distribution with
selective hiring, it may be optimal to set unemployment benets substantially higher than
under random hiring.
To our knowledge, our paper is one of the rst to analyze the role of ex-ante heterogeneity
on optimal unemployment insurance. In a related recent contribution, Lifschitz et al. (2017)
propose a model with heterogeneity in productivities, separation rates and costs of recruit-
ing for di¤erent education groups. They show that the optimal replacement rate increases
substantially with ex-ante heterogeneity, which is in line with our results, although based on
a completely di¤erent framework.
The basic trade-o¤ emphasized in the literature on optimal unemployment insurance,
is that unemployment benets insure risk-averse workers against variations in their income
and consumption, but discourage search e¤ort (Baily 1978, Chetty 2006). We contribute
to this literature by pointing out that with selective hiring of heterogeneous workers, the
insurance motive is (much) larger than with random hiring because unemployment risk is
higher for workers with low income and high marginal utility from consumption. Previous
studies have pointed out other reasons why the insurance motive may be more important, for
example because it allows workers to look for high-wage jobs with high unemployment risk
(Acemoglu and Shimer 1999) or because credit constraints prevent workers from self-insuring
against cyclical unemployment risk (Landais, Michaillat and Saez 2016, Moyen and Stähler
2014, Mitman and Rabinovich 2015). Depending on the degree of selectivity in hiring, the
e¤ect of ex-ante heterogeneity may be much stronger than these alternative mechanisms. It
seems likely that ex-ante heterogeneity also has implications for how optimal unemployment
insurance depends on the business cycle (Landais et al. 2016) or on unemployment duration
(Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997, 2009, Fredriksson and Holmlund 2006). However, we leave
this interesting question for future research.
This paper is only tangentially related to other studies using labor market models with
worker heterogeneity. A large literature, starting with Becker (1973), studies under what
conditions there is positive assortative matching between heterogeneous workers and rms.
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But the models in this literature are not used for welfare analysis. Directed search models,
as in Moen (1997), provide a description of the coordination friction that may underlie
the aggregate matching function and give rise to ex-post heterogeneity. But these models
generate heterogeneity as an equilibrium outcome and maintain the assumption that workers
are ex-ante homogeneous. An exception is Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2018), who
model an economy with directed search and worker heterogeneity, which gives rise to duration
dependence in job-nding probabilities as in our model. However, the focus of their paper
is entirely di¤erent from ours. Similarly, Shimers (2007) model of mismatch unemployment
can be thought of as a micro-foundation for an aggregate matching friction, which does not
a¤ect the predictions of the standard model in terms of welfare.
More recently, Chugh and Merkl (2016) and Epstein (2016) analyze how heterogeneity
a¤ects labor market dynamics. The conceptual framework in Chugh and Merkl, which models
heterogeneity as shocks to match quality, is similar to the model we use in this paper, whereas
Epstein models heterogeneity as workers having comparative advantages in particular jobs.
Compared to both of these papers, we focus on the normative predictions of the model, which
can be seen in steady state, as opposed to the predictions for business cycle uctuations.
Because of this di¤erence in focus, we emphasize the importance of selective versus random
hiring, whereas the heterogeneity in both Epstein (2016) and Chugh and Merkl (2016) gives
rise to what we would call random hiring.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes some evidence
from microeconomic labor market data that hiring decisions of rms in the real world are
partially selective. Section 3 sets up the model. In section 4, we derive the equilibrium
job creation condition and establish the equivalence of our model with random hiring to a
search model with an aggregate matching function. Section 5 deals with welfare analysis.
We discuss the conditions for job creation to be e¢ cient, and show how the welfare costs of
unemployment di¤er starkly under selective versus random hiring due to the di¤erent distri-
bution of consumption. Section 6 establishes the latter point quantitatively in an application
to optimal unemployment insurance. Section 7 concludes.
2 Selective Hiring: Motivating Evidence
It is probably uncontroversial that hiring decisions are at least partially selective, but it may
nevertheless be useful to start with a brief review of the evidence for this fact. This evidence
consists of facts that have been documented in other contexts, but that have not always been
interpreted as evidence for selective hiring.
The most direct evidence comes from the distribution of job-nding rates. If hiring is
perfectly random, then all workers have the same probability of nding a job. If hiring is
perfectly selective, then some, goodworkers nd jobs immediately, whereas other, bad
workers never nd jobs. In the data, the job-nding rate decreases with unemployment
duration, both in the US (Abraham and Shimer 2002) and in Europe (Wilke 2005).
A similar picture emerges when we compare the aggregate job-nding rate to the average
unemployment duration. If all workers have the same job-nding rate, then the average
unemployment duration D must simply be the inverse of the aggregate job-nding rate,
4
D = 1=f . If hiring is selective, then bad workers (with low job-nding probabilities) are
over-represented in the average unemployment duration and under-represented in the average
job-nding rate, so we would expect D > 1=f . In the data, unemployment duration is indeed
much longer than expected based on the aggregate job-nding rate (Shimer 2012). By a
similar argument, selective hiring may explain why the net job-nding rate, which excludes
workers with unemployment duration shorter than the period of observation, is smaller than
the gross job-nding rate (Shimer 2012).
The evidence for the duration dependence of individual job-nding rates is consistent with
an endogenous scarring e¤ect or loss of skill from unemployment spells as well as with ex-ante
heterogeneity. However, both Hornstein (2012) and Barnichon and Figura (2015) argue that
the data favor a selection story, in which workers with intrinsically lower job-nding rates
are overrepresented in the unemployment pool.
Another piece of evidence comes from the composition of the pools of employed and
unemployed workers. If hiring is selective, we would expect the quality of the employment
pool to be countercyclical, because workers that are only hired in booms are relatively bad
compared to workers that already had jobs in the recession. But by the same token, we would
expect the quality of the unemployment pool to be countercyclical as well, because workers
that are hired in booms are relatively good compared to workers that remain unemployed
even in booms. It has long been known that there is a composition bias in the cyclicality of
wages consistent with this story (Solon, Barsky and Parker 1994). Mueller (2017) recently
documented that the average predicted wage of unemployed workers is countercyclical as
well.
3 Model Environment
Our economy is populated by a continuum of worker-consumers i, characterized by "it. We
model worker characteristics as training costs: a rm that hires worker i in period t needs to
pay "it for this worker to become productive. Alternatively, we may think of "it as a measure
of worker productivity or match-specic skills, which would lead to minor modications to
the model but would leave the results unchanged, see section 7 for a discussion and appendix
A.3 for more details on the argument. Worker characteristics are fully observable to workers
and rms, so that there is perfect information in the economy. In our model, training costs
(or worker characteristics in general) determine how likely an individual worker is to be hired
in a given period.
Let G and g denote the distribution function and the probability density function of
training costs, "it  G. The distribution G is assumed to be constant across individuals and
time-invariant.3 This modelling framework is inspired by Brown, Merkl and Snower (2015),
although both the focus of the analysis and the details of the model are very di¤erent from
that paper.
Whether hiring is selective or random depends on the relative importance of transitory
and permanent components of individual worker characteristics. If "it is fully transitory, i.e.
if it is specic to a match rather than to an individual, then each worker expects to have the
3This does not mean, of course, that the average job nding rate is constant over time, since other factors
than "it also a¤ect the probability to be hired.
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same probability of being hired in future periods, so that hiring decisions are independent of
current worker characteristics and thus e¤ectively random from todays perspective. If "it is
permanent or individual-specic, i.e. "it = "i is xed for each worker over time, then current
worker characteristics fully determine how likely an individual worker is to be hired in the
future. This is what we call selective hiring. If "it includes both transitory and permanent
components, then hiring is partly random and partly selective.
3.1 Preferences
Worker-consumers are innitely-lived, have time-separable utility and care about the ex-
pected net present value of utility from consumption cit and leisure. They may be employed
or unemployed. Employed workers earn a wage wit, which may depend on worker character-
istics "it, and unemployed workers receive unemployment benets bt.
We assume the utility derived from leisure is zero, so that the ow utility U (:) depends
only on consumption. Then, workersobjective function is given by,
E0
1X
t=0
tU (cit) (1)
where  is the discount factor and E0 denotes rational expectations in period 0.
3.2 Production and Job Creation
Employed workers hold jobs, which produce output yt in each period, including the period in
which the worker was hired and trained. Our assumption that worker characteristics take the
form of training cost implies that the output of a job does not depend on the characteristics
of the worker that holds it. Given a wage wit, the rms prots from a job equal yt wit. The
cost of creating a job is the cost of training a worker, which has a xed component K and
an idiosyncratic component "it. It is worth emphasizing that there are no search frictions in
our model, so that jobs with positive value can be created immediately.
Since all jobs are identical after the worker has been trained, jobs created for workers with
low training costs generate more output in net present value than jobs created for workers
with high training costs. Thus, if it is e¢ cient to create a job for a worker with training costs
", then it must also be e¢ cient to create a job for a worker with lower training costs "0 < ".
We further assume that prots are at least weakly decreasing in training costs, so that this
property carries over to the equilibrium allocation as well.4 This implies that in the e¢ cient
as well as in the equilibrium allocation of our model, there exists a unique cuto¤ level ~"t,
such that a worker seeking a job is hired if "it < ~"t and not hired if "it > ~"t. Although the
existence of this hiring threshold is a property of the e¢ cient allocation or equilibrium and
not part of the environment, we will impose it below in order to simplify the notation.
4This is an assumption on the wage setting mechanism. Since wages may be decreasing in training costs,
workers with lower training costs can capture some of the higher surplus their labor creates. The assumption
is that this dependence of wages on training costs will not revert the e¤ect of training costs on prots. Most
reasonable wage setting mechanisms, and in particular Nash bargaining as we use in this paper, satisfy this
assumption.
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3.3 Markets
Worker-consumers and rms interact with each other on three types of markets. Firms hire
workers on the labor market. The goods rms produce are sold to consumers on the goods
market. Both rms and workers trade on asset markets.
On the labor market, rms hire unemployed workers, generating jobs and employed work-
ers. The surplus generated by a job match may be strictly positive in this model, because
of the heterogeneity in training costs. In this case, we assume that rm and worker Nash
bargain over this surplus in order to agree on a wage, see section 5.2. There is an exogenous
probability  that a job is destroyed, in which case the worker becomes unemployed again.
We assume full commitment of both worker and rm, so that regardless of the workers "it
both the rm and the worker must continue the job unless it is destroyed by a  shock and
there is no endogenous job destruction. Let f (~"t) denote the aggregate job-nding rate, the
probability that an average job seeker nds a job in each period. The aggregate job-nding
rate depends on the hiring threshold dened in section 3.2 above: the higher the threshold,
the larger the probability that any given job seeker is hired, everything else equal. Then, the
number of employed workers in the economy evolves according to,
nt = (1  )nt 1 + f (~"t) st = (1  ) (1  f (~"t))nt 1 + f (~"t) (2)
where st is the number of workers that seek a job in a given period. We assume job destruction
happens before job creation, so that the number of workers that are seeking jobs equals the
number of workers that are unemployed since last period, 1   nt 1, plus the number of
workers that were employed last period but lost their job in this period, nt 1. This timing
is consistent with our assumption that there are no hiring frictions in this model: workers
that are separated may be rehired immediately and do not have to wait until the next period.
Notice that the number of job seekers st = 1   (1  )nt 1 does not equal the number of
unemployed ut = 1  nt, because some of the job seekers nd new jobs within the period.
On the goods market, goods produced by rms are sold to workers for consumption.
Goods market clearing requires that the amount of goods produced equals the amount of
goods consumed by workers plus the amount of goods used to pay the training costs to
create jobs. We assume that if rms make any prots in excess of the amount they need
to pay the training costs, then these prots are distributed lump-sum to workers and then
consumed. Thus, the aggregate resource constraint is given by,Z 1
 1
citdG = ytnt   [1  (1  )nt 1] f (~"t) (K +H (~"t)) (3)
where K +H (~"t) denotes the average training cost of all workers that were hired in period
t. The idiosyncratic component of the average training costs of new hires H (~"t) depends on
the hiring threshold dened in section 3.2 above.
Asset markets are complete. The complete markets assumption allows workers to fully
insure against idiosyncratic variations in their income over time. However, since all assets
are in zero net supply, aggregate risk is not insurable. More importantly, since the unborn
do not have access to asset markets, workers cannot insure against their characteristics in
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period 0.
3.4 Road Map
In the next two sections of the paper, we solve for the equilibrium allocation of the model,
evaluate its properties and compare it to the e¢ cient allocation. Section 4 describes the
equilibrium allocation, and in particular the equilibrium job creation condition. Section 5
describes the e¢ cient allocation, and derives conditions under which the level of job creation
and the distribution of consumption resulting in equilibrium are e¢ cient. This section,
which contains the main result of the paper in its simplest form, shows that e¢ ciency of the
equilibrium depends crucially on whether worker characteristics are transitory or permanent.
4 Equilibrium Unemployment
In this section, we derive the equilibrium job creation condition and explore what are the
aggregate job-nding rate and unemployment rate implied by the job creation condition. To
do this, we need to specify whether hiring decisions are random or selective. We explore
both versions of the model and show that the predictions of our model for job creation are
very similar (and under some conditions identical) to the predictions of a standard Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides model with search frictions.5
The objective of this section is to show that the predictions of our model about the
cyclical behavior of the labor market are very similar to those of standard search models
of the labor market, and that it makes very little di¤erence for those predictions whether
hiring is random or selective. Welfare analysis, however, di¤ers sharply with the selectivity
of hiring. We postpone this issue to section 5.
4.1 Job Creation
In the decentralized equilibrium, jobs are created when both rms and workers at least weakly
prefer participating in a job match over their outside options. Since wages are set by Nash
bargaining, rms and workers share the surplus that the match generates and always agree
on whether a match is worth creating.
It is prot-maximizing, as we argued in section 3.2, to employ all workers with training
costs "it below a threshold ~"t and let workers with training costs above this threshold be
unemployed. Imposing this threshold propertyof the equilibrium, we can think of a repre-
sentative rm choosing the hiring threshold ~"t, which determines the total number of workers
they employ.
For the marginal hire, with training costs K + ~"t, the benets of hiring this worker must
exactly equal the training costs. These benets equal the expected net present value of prots
generated from a job. Thus, we get the following equilibrium job creation condition.
K + ~"t = Et
1X
=0
(1  ) Qt;t+ (yt+   ~wt;t+ ) (4)
5This is consistent with the interpretation in Pissarides (2000, p.4) that the matching function summarizes
a trading technology between heterogeneous agents that is also not made explicit.
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where ~wt;t+ is the wage in period t+  of the worker that is the marginal hire in period t,
and Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and t+ 1.
Qt;t+1 =
U 0 (ct+1)
U 0 (ct) (5)
For future reference, we also dene Qt;t+ = Qt;t+1Qt+1;t+2:::Qt+ 1;t+ for   1 and
Qt;t+ = 1 for  = 0.
It is worth noting that, as long as the threshold property holds, only the wage of the
marginal hire matters for job creation. The wages of all infra-marginal workers are purely
redistributive and do not change the allocation.
4.2 Job-Finding Rate
We now have a condition for the hiring threshold ~"t in equilibrium (4). The hiring thresh-
old determines the aggregate job-nding rate and unemployment rate. In this section, we
formalize this link.
The rst, and most important, observation is that in our framework, unlike in standard
labor market models with search frictions, the job-nding rate is not constant across workers.
Since rms hire only workers with training costs below the hiring threshold ~"t, the job-nding
probability of an individual worker fit is either 1 or 0, depending on her training costs "it.
fit =
(
1 if "it  ~"t
0 if "it > ~"t
(6)
The aggregate job-nding rate f (~"t) is then given by the average of the individual job-nding
probabilities of all job seekers,
f (~"t) =
R1
 1 fitsitdGR1
 1 sitdG
(7)
where sit is the fraction of type "it workers seeking a job. Notice that f (~"t) is the gross
job-nding rate, which includes workers who lost their job in the current period.
4.3 Random Hiring
In order to evaluate the integrals in (7), we need to know in a given period t how many workers
of each type "it are looking for a job.6 The composition of the pool of job seekers depends
crucially on whether invididual training costs are transitory or permanent. If training costs
are i.i.d. over time (as well as across workers), then each worker gets a new draw for "it in
each period, so that in any given period, the distribution of "it in the pool of job seekers
mirrors the aggregate distribution G. In this case, the number of job seekers as a fraction of
workers of each type equals the total number of job seekers as a fraction of the total labor
force, sit = st. In this case, the aggregate job-nding rate equals the probability that training
6We use the phrase looking for a job or job seeker loosely. With perfectly selective hiring, there are
some workers who do not have a job and who have zero probability of being o¤ered one, because their training
costs are too high. We still include those workers in the pool of unemployed workers as well as job seekers,
because at the current wage rate, they would accept a job if it were o¤ered to them. If hiring were partially
but not perfectly selective, these workers would have lower but not zero probability to nd jobs.
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costs are below the hiring threshold.
fRH (~"t) =
R ~"t
 1 1  st  dG+
R1
~"t
0  st  dGR1
 1 st  dG
= G (~"t) (8)
We refer to this case as perfectly random hiring, because at the beginning of the period, each
unemployed worker has the same probability of getting a good draw for "it and therefore the
same probability of nding a job, regardless of her current training costs. In other words, at
the beginning of the period, it is random which workers will get hired and which ones will
not.
Although we focus primarily on the job-nding rate, for completeness we also calculate the
steady state unemployment rate. The steady state unemployment rate equals ut = 1   nt,
where nt is the steady state fraction of workers that are employed implied by di¤erence
equation (2). The steady state unemployment rate for the model with random hiring equals
uRH =
 [1 G (~")]
 [1 G (~")] +G (~") (9)
Notice that the number of unemployed workers does not equal the number of workers with
training costs above the hiring threshold, because many of these workers are currently still
employed because they were hired in the past, when they had lower training costs.
4.4 Comparison to Models with Search Frictions
We show that the job creation equation in our model is the same as in a standard search and
matching model in the tradition of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985),
if we choose the distribution of training costs G appropriately. The distribution function of
worker heterogeneity plays the role of an aggregate matching function in search and matching
models.
The job creation condition in a model with search frictions equates the expected net
present value of rmsprots yt   wt to the expected net present value of vacancy posting
costs. Vacancy posting costs may include a xed component K, which is paid only at the
start of the vacancy, but also includes a ow cost k, the expected net present value of which
depends on the probability the vacancy is lled in each period qt.
K +
k
qt
= Et
1X
=0
(1  ) Qt;t+ (yt+   wt+ ) (10)
See Pissarides (2009, section 5) for the role of xed job creation costs in this type of model.
The job creation condition in the standard search model (10) equals the job creation
condition in our model (4) if Etwt+ = Et ~wt;t+ and k=qt = ~"t. The rst condition is
satised in general for some wage setting mechanisms.7 More importantly for the purposes
of this paper, if we assume wages in both models are set by Nash bargaining, the condition
holds true in steady state.
7For example, if all workers earn the same wage, so that ~wt;t+ = wt+ , as we assumed in a previous
version of this paper, the condition is trivially holds.
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The vacancy lling probability qt in the search model depends on labor market tightness
t, the ratio of vacancies vt over the number of unemployed workers ut, through the matching
technology, which relates new matches mt to the number of unemployed and the number
of vacancies. With a standard constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas matching function,
mt = u

t v
1 
t , we get qt = mt=vt = 
 
t . The job-nding rate in this model is also related
to labor market tightness through the matching function, ft = mt=ut = 
1 
t . Thus, we can
write the vacancy lling probability in terms of the job-nding rate, qt = 
 
t = f
 =(1 )
t ,
so that k=qt = kf
=(1 )
t . Thus, the job creation condition in our model equals the one from
the standard search model if k=qt = kf
=(1 )
t = ~"t or
ft =

~"t
k
 1 

(11)
Comparing expression (11) to (8), it is clear that we can choose a distribution function G
such that the job creation condition in our model under random hiring is the same as in
the standard model. The distribution that makes the job creation conditions identical is
G (") = ("=k)
(1 )= for 0  "  k, which means that 1="it follows a Pareto distribution.
Since the law of motion for employment (2) is the same in both models, identical job
creation conditions and job-nding rates implies that the predictions for (un)employment
are identical as well. Thus, our model provides a framework to think about the selectivity
of hiring, while maintaining the insights about unemployment dynamics from standard labor
market models.
In our model, worker heterogeneity plays the same role as the congestion externality,
modelled through the aggregate matching function, in the standard model. In a boom,
when productivity is high, it becomes harder to hire in the search and matching model
because the labor market gets congestedwith vacancies. In our model, hiring is costlier in a
boom because rms are forced to hire workers with larger training costs in order to increase
employment.
4.5 Selective Hiring
Now consider the polar opposite case, in which individual training costs are xed over time,
"it = "i. In this case, there are two reasons why a worker may be seeking a job in period t.
A worker with training costs above the hiring threshold was unemployed in period t  1 and
is therefore a job seeker in period t. Since this worker will have the same training costs in
period t as she had in period t 1, she will be very unlikely to be hired in period t. In fact, if
the economy is in steady state, the individual job-nding probability of these workers is zero.
A worker with training costs below the threshold in period t 1 was employed in that period.
However, such a worker may have been separated from her job in period t and consequently
is a job seeker as well. Again assuming the economy is in steady state, if this worker was
employed in period t   1, she will again be o¤ered a job in period t with probability one.
The fraction of goodworkers that are seeking jobs equals , the probability that any given
existing job is destroyed, so that si =  if "it  ~". Since all badworkers seek jobs, si = 1
if "it > ~". Thus, the (steady state) job-nding rate in this case is given by the following
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expression.
fSH (~") =
R ~"
 1 1    dG+
R1
~"
0  1  dGR ~"
 1   dG+
R1
~"
1  dG
=
G (~")
G (~") + 1 G (~") (12)
We refer to this case as perfectly selective hiring, because at the beginning of the period
everyone knows which workers will be hired and which will remain unemployed. Firms pick
out the goodworkers, with low training costs, from the pool of job seekers and ignore the
badworkers.
The steady state unemployment rate for the model with selective hiring equals
uSH = 1 G (~") (13)
Under selective hiring, the steady state unemployment rate equals the fraction of workers
with training costs above the hiring threshold, because these workers will never be hired,
whereas all other workers will always be immediately rehired in case they loose their job.
The di¤erences between the model with random and selective hiring are driven by di¤er-
ences in the quality of the pool of job seekers between both models. If hiring is random, the
pool of job seekers is a reection of the overall distribution of workers. If hiring is selective
on the other hand, workers with low training costs are unlikely to be unemployed, so that
the pool of job seekers consists largely of lemons. How large this di¤erence is depends on the
separation rate . If  = 0, the job-nding rate with selective hiring is equal to zero because
all job seekers have training costs that are too high to be hired. If  = 1, the job-nding
rate is the same under selective and random hiring, because in both cases job seekers are
representative for the distribution of all workers.
Comparing expressions (8) and (12) for the job-nding rate and (9) and (13) for the
unemployment rate, it seems that the models with random and selective hiring have very
di¤erent predictions for labor market dynamics. This is not true. The di¤erence between the
job-nding and unemployment rates under selective versus random hiring is mostly a level
shift. If we were to use these models to generate a standard set of business cycle statistics
for the volatility, persistence and comovement of labor market variables, we would calibrate
the model parameters to match the steady state job-nding or unemployment rate. The
di¤erences in calibration would o¤set the di¤erences in the expressions, and the predictions
of the models would be quite similar.8
What about the equivalence of the model with a standard search and matching model?
Since the expression for the job-nding rate under selective hiring (12) is di¤erent from
the one under random hiring (8), it is clear that condition (11) will not make the model
with selective hiring equivalent to a standard search model with a Cobb-Douglas matching
function. However, we could choose a di¤erent distribution for G that would guarantee that
fSH (") = ("=k)
(1 )= for all ". Under this modied condition, our model with selective
hiring would again be equivalent to a standard search model. In words, when we change the
8To see this, note that the elasticity of the job nding rate with respect to productivity yt from equations
(8) and (12) equals a constant times the elasticity of the hiring threshold ~"t with respect to yt, which is the
same in both models. The proportionality factor is di¤erent in the two models, but depends only on the
separation rate  and the shape of the training costs distribution G.
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assumptions on the time series properties of training costs "it, we need to recalibrate the
distribution of these costs G, but we can always nd a distribution that makes our model
equivalent to a standard search and matching model in terms of its predictions for aggregate
labor market variables.
The fact that our model with both random and selective hiring can be made equivalent
to a standard search model in terms of the job creation equation does not mean, of course,
that all predictions of the model are the same for random and selective hiring. In section 2,
we discussed observable predictions that allow us to distinguish one model from the other in
the data. In addition, the two models have very di¤erent implications for welfare analysis,
to which we turn in the next section.
5 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we derive the e¢ cient allocation in our model and compare it to the equi-
librium. In order to obtain simple, easily interpretable expressions, we evaluate the model
without aggregate shocks. We show that job creation can be e¢ cient with both random
and selective hiring, under slightly di¤erent conditions. We also show that the equilibrium
consumption allocation with random hiring equals the allocation chosen by the social plan-
ner, but the equilibrium consumption allocation under selective hiring is far from e¢ cient.
The reason is that under selective hiring, unemployment risk is highly unequally distributed
across workers. The objective of this section is to make these points in the simplest possible
setting. Section 6 presents a numerical analysis to explore how important the di¤erences are
quantitatively.
5.1 E¢ cient Allocation
The social welfare function aggregates the utility (1) of all workers in the economy. We assume
a utilitarian welfare function, which weighs the utility of all individuals equally. Thus, the
social planner maximizes,
1X
t=0
t
Z 1
 1
U (cit) dG (14)
subject to the law of motion for employment (2) and the aggregate resource constraint (3).
The planner chooses how many workers to employ, which workers to employ, and how to
distribute consumption over all employed and unemployed workers. As we argued in section
3.2, it is e¢ cient to employ all workers with training costs "it below a threshold ~"t and let
workers with training costs above this threshold be unemployed. Imposing this property of
the e¢ cient allocation, the planner chooses the hiring threshold ~"t and the consumption level
of each worker fcitg1i= 1 in each period t.
The solution to the social planner problem is straightforward. Details may be found in
appendix A.1. The results can be summarized in two e¢ ciency conditions, one about the
e¢ cient consumption allocation and the second one about e¢ cient job creation.
In the e¢ cient allocation, consumption is equal for all workers.
cit = ct = c for all i and t (15)
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The level of consumption can be found by substituting this result into the aggregate resource
constraint, but is not of interest here. The important observation is that the social planner
awards the same level of consumption to all workers, whether employed or unemployed and
independent of their training costs "it. Of course this result depends to some degree on
specic assumptions, in particular the additive separability of utility in consumption and
leisure. The intuition for the result, however, is quite general. It is also important to note that
any reasonable welfare function would deliver the same result. By equalizing consumption
across workers, the planner minimizes the welfare loss from poor workers, who would have
very steep marginal utility of consumption.
The e¢ cient hiring threshold ~"t depends on whether hiring is random or selective. The
(steady state version of the) e¢ cient job creation condition under random hiring is
K + ~" =
1 + r
r + 
y   1  
r + 
G (~") (~" H (~")) (16)
Under selective hiring, the corresponding condition is simply
K + ~" =
1 + r
r + 
y (17)
where r = 1= (1  ) is the discount rate. See appendix A.1 for the derivation of these
conditions.
E¢ cient job creation equates the net present value of output generated by the marginal
job, an annuity of output y in all future periods, discounted by the rate of time preference r
and the rate of job destruction , to the cost of creating that job. The cost of creating the
marginal job includes the cost of training the marginal worker, K + ~", and under selective
hiring that is the only cost of job creation. If hiring is random, however, there is an additional
cost of hiring the marginal worker, which is a worker with relatively high training costs: by
hiring this worker, the planner loses the option value of next periods draw of training costs
for that workers being lower. This option value realizes if this periods job, if created,
still exists next period, preventing the worker from obtaining a new draw, which happens
with probability (1  ), and next periods draw for the training costs are below the hiring
threshold, which happens with probability G (~"). In this case, the expected gain equals the
di¤erence between the marginal workers training costs ~" and the average training costs of
tomorrows hires H (~").
To compare e¢ cient job creation conditions (16) and (17) to equilibrium job creation
condition (4), we need to be more specic about wage determination. We discuss this in the
next subsection.
5.2 Wage Setting and Job Creation
Wages are set by Nash bargaining between an individual worker and the rm that employs
her. We assume that bargaining happens at the start of a job, and the wage stays constant
thereafter until the match is destroyed. Let  denote workers bargaining power, so that the
wage is given by
wit = w
F
R ("it) + (1  )wWR (18)
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where wFR ("it) and w
W
R are the reservation wages of the rm and the worker, respectively.
The reservation wage of the rm wFR ("it) is the wage, at which prots are zero
wFR ("it) = y  
r + 
1 + r
(K + "it) (19)
It is protable for the rm to participate in a match if it can at least recoup the training costs
of the worker. Thus, workers must take a pay cut with respect to the output they produce
in order to pay back (in expectation) their own training costs. As a result, betterworkers,
with lower training costs, earn higher wages.
The reservation wage of the worker wWR depends on whether hiring is random or selective.
The expressions for these reservation wage of a worker below are derived formally in appendix
A.2, but they are intuitively simple to understand.
5.2.1 Random Hiring
First, consider the case of random hiring. In this case, the reservation wage of the worker,
wWR = (1  ) b+ 

y   r + 
1 + r
(K +H (~"))

(20)
is a weighted average of unemployment benets and the surplus (which also equals the reser-
vation wage of the rm) of an alternative job with average training costs H (~"). The weight
 =
 (1  )G (~")
r + +  (1  )G (~") (21)
depends on the workers bargaining power as well as on the job nding rate, the separation
rate and the discount rate.
For the marginal worker that is hired, the reservation wages of rm and worker equal
each other. Setting wFR (~") = w
W
R , using (19), evaluated in ~", and (20), and rearranging, we
get the following equilibrium job creation condition.
K + ~" =
1 + r
r + 
(y   b)   (1  )
r + 
G (~") (~" H (~")) (22)
Comparing this condition to the e¢ cient job creation condition (16), we can calculate the
e¢ cient level of unemployment benets.
be¤ = (1  ) 1  
1 + r
G (~") (~" H (~")) (23)
Of interest is the special case, in which workers have all the bargaining power,  = 1. In this
case, e¢ cient unemployment benets equal zero, b = 0, as in a standard search and matching
model.9 More generally, if  < 1, the e¢ cient benet level is strictly positive. Without these
positive benets, workers accept jobs too often, because they do not fully take into account
the potential gains from a new draw for their training costs.
9Here, we interpret b as unemployment benets. If b represents home production and/or utility from
leisure, then any b is e¢ cient in the standard model.
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5.2.2 Selective Hiring
The case of selective hiring is considerably simpler. Since in this case individual training costs
are xed over time, and there are no frictions on the labor market, a worker would be able to
immediately nd an identical job if bargaining were to break down. Therefore, with selective
hiring, workers capture the full surplus of a job match: the workers reservation wage equals
the equilibrium wage, which must then equal the rms reservation wage, wit = wFR ("it) for
all employed workers i. An unemployed worker will be unemployed in all future periods as
well. Thus, the marginal workers wage equals unemployment benets. Setting wFR (~") = b,
and using (19), evaluated in ~", we get the following equilibrium job creation condition under
selective hiring.
K + ~" =
1 + r
r + 
(y   b) (24)
Comparing this condition to the e¢ cient job creation condition (17) under selective hiring,
we immediately see that the e¢ cient level of unemployment benets is always zero in this
case, be¤ = 0.
5.2.3 Hiring Externality
The di¤erence in job creation between random and selective hiring is an externality. Firms
do not take into account the e¤ect of hiring an additional worker today on the amount of
job seekers tomorrow. With random hiring, i.e. if training costs are fully match-specic,
then a worker that was not hired today might be very employable (have low training costs)
tomorrow. Since rms fail to take this e¤ect into account, they hire more workers than is
e¢ cient. Positive unemployment benets push up wages and counteract this overhiring, thus
restoring e¢ ciency of job creation.
With selective hiring, i.e. with fully worker-specic training costs, each worker will be
just as employable tomorrow as they are today. If it is not protable to hire a particular
worker today, then this worker will not be hired tomorrow either, so that there is no external
e¤ect of todays hiring decisions on tomorrows. Moreover, if workers have all the bargaining
power,  = 1, then workers e¤ectively pay for their own training, so that they capture the full
(social) costs and benets of hiring and thus internalize the e¤ect of todays hiring decisions
on tomorrows. In both cases, e¢ cient job creation is achieved by setting unemployment
benets to zero.
The hiring externality is the rst di¤erence for welfare analysis if hiring is selective. The
second di¤erence has to do with the consumption distribution, to which we now turn.
5.3 Consumption Distribution
In equilibrium, each worker i chooses her consumption in each period t in order to maximize
the net present value of her utility (1), subject to a budget constraint. In order to smooth
their consumption over time workers trade assets, which are in zero net supply. Since asset
markets are complete, the consumption of all individual workers moves in lock-step with
aggregate consumption.
cit
cit+1
=
ct
ct+1
for all i and t (25)
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Without aggregate shocks, aggregate consumption is constant over time, so that individual
consumption is constant over time for all individuals as well.
cit = ci for all i and t (26)
Complete asset markets, in the absence of aggregate shocks, allow consumers to insure against
variations in their income and fully smooth their consumption over time.
The level of consumption of each individual is determined by her life-time budget con-
straint. Assuming individuals are born with zero assets, life-time income equals the expected
value of income at birth,
ci = E0mit = uib+ (1  ui)E0wit +  (27)
where ui is the unemployment rate of type "it workers and where  denotes prots, which
we assume to be redistributed lump-sum from rms to workers.
Expected future income, and therefore consumption, depends exclusively on unconditional
unemployment risk. By assuming asset markets are complete, we rule out any welfare costs
due to bad luck. We do this on purpose, in order to focus on the welfare loss deriving
from the fact that unemployment risk is distributed unequally across workers. Comparing
the equilibrium condition (27) to e¢ ciency condition (15), we see that the consumption
allocation is e¢ cient, if and only if unemployment risk is distributed evenly across workers.
5.3.1 Random versus Selective Hiring
The worker-specic unemployment risk depends crucially on whether training costs "it are
transitory (match-specic) or permanent (worker-specic). In the case of perfectly random
hiring, with "it uncorrelated over time, each worker gets a new draw for "it in each period, so
that the unconditional unemployment risk of each worker equals the aggregate unemployment
rate, uRHi = u for all i, and the expected wage equals the average wage E0wit = w, so that
consumption is equal across individuals, as in the e¢ cient allocation (15).
In the case of perfectly selective hiring, with "it = "i xed over time for each worker, some
workers, with low training costs, are always employed, whereas other, with training costs
above the hiring threshold, are always unemployed. In this case, individual unemployment
risk is highly unequally distributed.
uSHi =
(
0 if "i  ~"
1 if "i > ~"
(28)
In addition, in this case each worker expects a di¤erent wage, consistent with her training
costs, E0wit = wi. Substituting (27) and individual unemployment risk (28) and wages into
the welfare function (14), we get welfare under selective and random hiring.
WSH = u U (b+ ) + (1  u)
Z ~"
 1
U (wit + ) dG
 U
 
u (b+ ) + (1  u)
 Z ~"
 1
witdG+ 
!!
=WRH (29)
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Since average wages and unemployment benets are assumed to be the same under random
and selective hiring, the inequality follows directly from the concavity of utility function U
by Jensens inequality.
By assuming asset markets are complete and there are no aggregate shocks, we have
assumed that individual workers can completely self-insurance against unemployment risk
due to bad luck. However, the di¤erences in unemployment risk between goodworkers with
low training costs and badworkers with high training costs in the model with selective
hiring, are uninsurable. Once a worker is born and enters the labor market, her type "it is
observable to all market participants. At that point, for workers with high training costs the
bad shock has already realized and they can no longer buy insurance against it. It is this
unemployment risk across workers, rather than the unemployment risk over the life-time of a
worker, that drives the di¤erence in e¢ ciency between the models with selective and random
hiring. A di¤erent way to see the same point, is that while the two models are equally e¢ cient
in creating jobs, the distribution of job opportunities is more equitable with random hiring.
In the model with selective hiring, there is in some sense a missing asset market for insur-
ance against individual training costs. Therefore, there is a role for government intervention,
insuring unborn workers against a bad draw for their training costs. This is the second
di¤erence for welfare analysis if hiring is selective. We analyze the di¤erences between selec-
tive and random hiring for welfare quantitatively in the next section, using unemployment
insurance policy as a specic example.
6 Application: Optimal Unemployment Insurance
In the previous sections, we showed that although the predictions of our model for unem-
ployment uctuations are very similar under random and selective hiring, welfare analysis is
di¤erent in the two versions of our model. As a concrete application of this general result, in
this section we explore how optimal unemployment insurance di¤ers under (perfectly) ran-
dom and (perfectly) selective hiring. We assume the government does not observe individual
training costs "it and can only redistribute income based on employment status as a proxy
for individual characteristics. By providing unemployment benets, the government tries to
insure workers against a bad draw for their training costs. This is a di¤erent motive for
unemployment insurance than the intertemporal insurance motive usually considered in the
literature. The government faces a trade-o¤ because unemployment benets discourage job
creation.
The objectives of this section are to illustrate the main result in a concrete application and
to explore how important the di¤erence are quantitatively. In this application, we maintain
the assumption from section 5 that there are no aggregate shocks.
6.1 Ramsey Problem
To derive the optimal unemployment insurance policy, we specify the Ramsey problem for
a government that sets its policy instruments, unemployment benets and lump-sum taxes,
subject to its budget constraint, such that the resulting competitive equilibrium is the best
possible, in the sense that it maximizes social welfare. Thus, the government chooses b and
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 to maximize welfare (14). We assume the government needs to run a balanced budget, so
that the government budget constraint is given by
(1  n) b =  (30)
Notice that we focus on the implications of the model for the level of unemployment insurance
and therefore do not allow the government to set time-varying unemployment benets or
taxes.
In addition to its budget constraint, the government also takes the optimality conditions
for job creation (4) and consumption allocation (25), the market clearing conditions for the
labor market (2) and goods market (3), and wage setting rule (18) as constraints on its
optimization problem:
Without aggregate shocks, i.e. yt = y for all t, the economy converges to a steady
state. Assuming we start o¤ the economy in steady state (or wait su¢ ciently long so that
convergence has been reached), the equilibrium conditions become static. In steady state,
the Ramsey planner chooses b and  to maximizeZ 1
 1
U (cit) dG (31)
subject to the government budget constraint (30), the steady state job creation condition
(22) or (24), the steady state labor market clearing condition,
n =
f (~")
+ (1  ) f (~") (32)
and the optimal consumption rule (27). Aggregate consumption must satisfy the aggregate
resource constraint (3)
c = yn  [1  (1  )n] f (~") (K +H (~")) (33)
6.2 Calibration
We use an inverse-Pareto distribution for the idiosyncratic component of training costs under
random hiring G, which makes the model isomorphic to a standard search and matching
model in terms of the steady state of all labor market variables as explained in section 4.4
above, see equation (11). We assume  = 0:6 and set k to match the job nding probability,
as is standard in the literature (see. e.g. Mortensen and Nagypal 2007). The distribution
function under selective hiring is recalibrated such that the job nding rate under selective
hiring as in equation (12) equals the job nding rate under random hiring, as in equation
(8), see the last paragraph of section 4.5 for details.
The targets for the job nding probability of 0:8 per quarter, and the separation rate,
which we set to  = 0:07 per quarter, are consistent with the timing of the model, which
allows workers to nd a job within the period after being separated, see Galí and van Rens
(2017). We set the mean training costs, which would correspond to the xed costs of vacancy
creation in a search and matching model, to zero, K = 0.
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Finally, we use logarithmic utility over consumption U (ci) = log ci, normalize productiv-
ity to y = 1, and set the discount rate to 4% per year,  = 0:99. All calibration targets are
matched for the model with zero unemployment benets, b = 0, and full worker bargaining
power,  = 1, and are kept constant across model comparisons.
6.3 Results
As a benchmark, we start with the case of random hiring and full bargaining power for
workers,  = 1. Figure 1 shows employment, aggregate production, and welfare for various
levels of unemployment benets in this model. In this case, it is optimal to set unemployment
benets to zero. The reason is that there is no trade-o¤. With  = 1, workers e¤ectively pay
for their own training costs, so that they full internalize the hiring externality. And since
unemployment risk is equally distributed across all workers, no redistribution is necessary.
Nor are unemployment benets an e¤ective instrument for redistribution, because all workers
are unemployed an equal amount of time and thus receive the same amount of benets. Thus,
production and welfare are maximized at b = 0.
In Figure 2, we show the same set of results, still with random hiring, but for  = 0:5. In
this case, employment at b = 0 is ine¢ ciently high. Workers no longer fully internalize the
hiring externality because they bear only part of the costs and benets of hiring. Therefore,
workers with high training costs are employed, whereas society would be better o¤ if they
remained unemployed for one period in order to receive a new, possibly lower, draw for their
training costs. Prot-maximizing rms do not take this e¤ect into account, because the
benets of the lower training costs next period are likely to accrue to a di¤erent rm. Higher
unemployment benets counteract the externality, and in our calibration, production and
welfare are maximized for a benet level of b = 0:20.
With selective hiring there is a motive for redistribution, so that the government faces
a trade-o¤: by raising unemployment benets, the government redistributes income from
unemployed to employed workers, but at the same time discourages job creation, which
would be e¢ cient with b = 0. Therefore, in this case the Ramsey planner cannot replicate
the e¢ cient allocation, and we would expect optimal unemployment benets to be higher
than under random hiring, resulting in an ine¢ ciently low level of employment. Figures
3 shows employment, production and welfare as a function of unemployment benets for
the model with selective hiring. The maximum level of welfare that can be reached under
selective hiring is lower than under random hiring, because unemployment benets distort
job creation.
In our calibration, the optimal level of unemployment benets under selective hiring is
higher than under random hiring, around b = 0:26. Comparing the results for selective hiring
in Figure 3 to those for random hiring with  = 0:5 in Figure 2, we see two di¤erent reasons
for positive levels of unemployment benets, which are valid in two di¤erent worlds. If hiring
is random, then positive unemployment benets are a way to drive up wages, which corrects
for ine¢ ciently high job creation due to the hiring externality. If hiring is selective, then
unemployment benets provide insurance against idiosyncratic shocks that realize before
birth and that are therefore uninsurable through private markets. Despite the observation
that in our simulations the optimal levels of unemployment benets in both worlds may be
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similar for some parameterizations, it is worth noting that the welfare losses of ine¢ ciently low
unemployment benets are two orders of magnitude greater under selective hiring than under
random hiring, and we therefore think of selective hiring as the more convincing argument
for positive unemployment benets.
7 Conclusions
In the real world, hiring decisions are selective. Firms choose not only how many, but also
which workers to hire. As a result, job-nding probabilities and unemployment risk vary
across workers. In standard search models of the labor market, however, hiring is random, in
the sense that the job-nding probability is the same for all workers. In this paper we argue
that selectivity in hiring strongly a¤ects conclusions about welfare.
We present a model, in which hiring decisions may be random or selective. The predictions
of this model for unemployment uctuations are identical to those of a standard search and
matching model. We also show, however, that the predictions of the model regarding welfare
may be very di¤erent for selective versus random hiring. As an application, we analyze
optimal unemployment insurance in our framework.
Under random hiring, the government can replicate the e¢ cient allocation, using unem-
ployment benets and lump-sum taxes as instruments. In this case, unemployment benets
are set to make sure the level of job creation is e¢ cient. The optimal level of unemployment
benets is usually positive, because a hiring externality leads to overhiring, but the welfare
losses of ine¢ ciently low benet levels are small.
Under selective hiring, the hiring externality is not present, but -because unemployment
risk is distributed unequally across workers- the government faces a trade-o¤between e¢ cient
job creation and e¢ cient redistribution. There is an additional motive for unemployment
insurance, because workers cannot self-insure against their characteristics, which determine
their individual-specic unemployment risk. As a result, under selective hiring unemployment
benets are usually higher (and employment and welfare lower) than under random hiring,
and the welfare gains from positive benet levels are substantial.
We believe the point we make in this paper applies fairly generally. In our model, het-
erogeneity takes the form of di¤erences in training costs across workers. However, other
sources of heterogeneity are likely to have very similar implications. In particular, we show
in appendix A.3 that a model with workers that di¤er in their productivity, in the absence
of aggregate shocks, is isomorphic to our model.
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A Appendices
A.1 Social Planner Problem
The value function and the Bellman equation of the social planner problem (14) are given by
V (nt 1; yt) = maxf~"t+ ;fcit+g1i= 1g1=t
Et
1X
=0

Z 1
 1
U (cit+ ) dG (34)
= max
~"t;fcitg1i= 1
Z 1
 1
U (cit) dG+ EtV (nt; yt+1)

(35)
where yt is an exogenous state variable and nt 1 an endogenous state variable, with law of
motion as in equation (2),
nt = (1  )nt 1 + JC (nt 1;~"t) (36)
Notice that hiring is instantaneous (there are no search frictions in this economy), so that
nt 1, not nt, is the state variable. The hiring threshold and consumption in period t are
chosen subject to the aggregate resource constraint (3).Z 1
 1
citdG = ytnt   JC (nt 1;~"t) (K +H (~"t)) (37)
Let t denote the multiplier associated with the aggregate resource constraint in period t.
The rst set of e¢ ciency conditions resulting from this optimization problem are the
rst-order conditions for cit
U 0 (cit) = t (38)
These rst-order conditions for cit immediately imply that cit = ct, as in equation (15) in the
main text. The level of consumption in period t can be found by substituting this into the
aggregate resource constraint, noting that G is a CDF, so that
R1
 1 citdG = ct
R1
 1 dG = ct.
E¢ cient job creation depends on whether hiring is random or selective.
A.1.1 Random hiring
Under random hiring, a fraction G (~"t) of all job seekers receive a relatively low draw for their
training costs, making them employable. Thus, the number of workers that are hired equals
JC (nt 1;~"t) = [1  (1  )nt 1]G (~"t) (39)
a fraction G (~"t) of the total number of non-employed workers, including the ones that were
separated in this period.
Substituting this expression for job creation into the law of motion for employment (36)
and the aggregate resource constraint (37) above, we get the following rst order condition
for ~"t
yt  K  H (~"t)  H
0 (~"t)G (~"t)
g (~"t)
+
Et [V
0 (nt; yt+1)]
t
= 0 (40)
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and envelope condition for nt 1
V 0 (nt 1; yt) = (1  )t f(1 G (~"t)) yt +G (~"t) (K +H (~"t))g
+ (1  ) (1 G (~"t))EtV 0 (nt; yt+1) (41)
Using the rst order condition for ~"t to substitute out for Et [V 0 (nt; yt+1)] in the envelope
condition for nt 1, we get an expression for V 0 (nt 1; yt).
V 0 (nt 1; yt) = (1  )t

K +H (~"t) + (1 G (~"t)) H
0 (~"t)G (~"t)
g (~"t)

(42)
Substituting this expression back into the envelope condition for nt 1, we get an Euler
equation for the hiring threshold ~"t,
K +M (~"t) = yt +  (1  )Et

t+1
t
fK +M (~"t+1) G (~"t+1) (M (~"t+1) H (~"t+1))g

(43)
where t = U 0 (ct) and
M (~"t) = H (~"t) +
H 0 (~"t)G (~"t)
g (~"t)
(44)
To evaluateM (~"t), we need the distribution of training costs "it in the pool of job seekers.
Under perfectly random hiring, the distribution of training costs among job seekers equals
the unconditional distribution of training costs, so this distribution is just G. Then, average
training costs are given by the following expression.
H (~"t) =
R ~"t
 1 "dG (")
G (~"t)
=
R ~"t
 1 "dG (")
G (~"t)
(45)
Taking a derivative with respect to the training costs of the marginal hire ~"t, we get,
H 0 (~"t) =
~"tg (~"t)
G (~"t)
 
R ~"t
 1 "dG (")
G (~"t)
2 g (~"t) =
g (~"t)
G (~"t)
[~"t  H (~"t)] (46)
so that M (~"t) = ~"t. Substituting into Euler equation (43) gives the e¢ cient job creation
condition,
K + ~"t = yt + (1  )Et [Qt;t+1 fK + ~"t+1  G (~"t+1) (~"t+1  H (~"t+1))g] (47)
and evaluating this equation in steady state yields condition (16) in the main text.
A.1.2 Selective hiring
Under selective hiring, the problem is asymmetric depending on whether the initial level
of employment is above or below steady state. If last periods employment was below the
desired steady state level, then all workers with training costs below ~"t are hired immediately,
and employment jumps to its steady state level. If we start from a level of employment that
is above the desired level or the steady state, i.e. if nt 1  G (~"t), then only those workers
that are separated and have training costs below ~"t will be hired, i.e. a fraction G (~"t) =nt 1
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of the nt 1 workers that are separated, so that
JC (nt 1;~"t) = G (~"t) (48)
Employment will slowly fall, as workers with training costs above ~"t that are employed for
historic reasons gradually lose their jobs.
Substituting this expression for job creation into the law of motion for employment (36)
and the aggregate resource constraint (37) above, the Bellman equation can be written as,
V (nt 1; yt) = max
~"t;fcitg1i= 1
Z 1
 1
U (cit) dG+ EtV (nt; yt+1)

(49)
where
nt = (1  )nt 1 + G (~"t) (50)
and subject to the aggregate resource constraint.Z 1
 1
citdG = ytnt   G (~"t) (K +H (~"t)) (51)
The rst-order condition for ~"t
yt  K  H (~"t)  G (~"t)H
0 (~"t)
g (~"t)
+
EtV
0 (nt; yt+1)
t
= 0 (52)
and the envelope condition for nt 1
V 0 (nt 1; yt) = (1  )tyt + (1  )EtV 0 (nt; yt+1) (53)
can be combined to get the following Euler equation for ~"t
K +M (~"t) = yt +  (1  )Et

t+1
t
fK +M (~"t+1)g

(54)
where
M (~"t) = H (~"t) +
H 0 (~"t)G (~"t)
g (~"t)
(55)
as under random hiring.
In steady state, the distribution of training costs among new hires equals G, as for random
hiring, so thatM (~") = ~". This gives the e¢ cient job creation condition under selective hiring
(17) in the main text.
A.2 Nash bargaining over Wages
A.2.1 Derivation of equation (20)
Let V U and V E (wit) denote the expected net present value of payo¤s for an unemployed
worker, and an employed worker with wage wit, respectively.
Under random hiring, the values V U and V E (W (~")) are determined by the following
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system of Bellman equations,
V U = b+G (~")V E (W (~")) + (1 G (~"))V U (56)
V E (wit) = wit +  (1 G (~"))V U + (1  )V E (wit) + G (~")V E (W (~")) (57)
where W (~") is the wage of the average employed worker.
At the reservation wage wWR , a worker is just indi¤erent between working or being unem-
ployed, V E
 
wWR
  V U = 0, so that
V E ( ~w)  V U = ~w   b+ (1  )  V E ( ~w)  V U  (1  )G (~")  V E (W (~"))  V U = 0
(58)
wWR = b+ (1  )G (~")
 
V E (W (~"))  V U (59)
Averaging the Bellman equation for an employed worker over training costs, we get
V E (W (~"))  V U = W (~")  b+ (1  ) (1 G (~"))  V E (W (~"))  V U (60)
=
1 + r
r + + (1  )G (~") (W (~")  b) (61)
and substituting this into (59) we get the following expression for the reservation wage of
workers.
wWR = b+ (1  )G (~")
W (~")  b
r + + (1  )G (~") (62)
To eliminate W (~"), we evaluate the Nash bargaining wage rule (18) and combine it with
expression (19), evaluated in H (~"), and (62) to get an expression for wWR in terms of the
hiring threshold ~" and parameters only.
W (~") = wFR (H (~")) + (1  )wWR = 

y   r + 
1 + r
(K +H (~"))

+ (1  )wWR (63)
Substituting into (62),
wWR = b+ (1  )G (~")

h
y   r+1+r (K +H (~"))
i
+ (1  )wWR   b
r + + (1  )G (~") (64)
=
r + 
r + +  (1  )G (~")b+
 (1  )G (~")
r + +  (1  )G (~")

y   r + 
1 + r
(K +H (~"))

(65)
gives equation (20) in the main text.
A.2.2 Derivation of equation (22)
Using (19), evaluated in ~"
wFR (~") = y  
r + 
1 + r
(K + ~") (66)
and (20), and setting wFR (~") = w
W
R , we get the following expression that pins down ~".
y   r + 
1 + r
(K + ~") = (1  ) b+ 

y   r + 
1 + r
(K +H (~"))

(67)
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Add and subtract ~" in the right-hand-side expression,
y   r + 
1 + r
(K + ~") = (1  ) b+ 

y   r + 
1 + r
(K + ~"  ~"+H (~"))

(68)
take y   r+1+r (K + ~") to the left-hand side,
(1  )

y   r + 
1 + r
(K + ~")

= (1  ) b+ 

r + 
1 + r
(~" H (~"))

(69)
take y to the right-hand side, divide by 1  , and multiply by   1+rr+
K + ~" =
1 + r
r + 
(y   b)  
1   (~" H (~")) (70)
Finally, simplify the 1  term,

1   =
 (1  )G (~")
r + +  (1  )G (~")   (1  )G (~") =
 (1  )G (~")
r + 
(71)
and substitute above the get equation (22) in the main text.
A.3 Heterogeneous Productivity
Job creation condition (4) already imposes the threshold propertyof the equilibrium, i.e.
all workers with training costs below a threshold "it < ~"t are hired and all those above are
not. More generally, we can rewrite this condition as a condition for each individual worker
i with training costs "it to be hired if
K + "it  Et
1X
=0
(1  ) Qi;t;t+ (yt+   wit) (72)
Without aggregate shocks, this condition, which simply states that a worker is hired if the
total hiring and training costs K + "it are smaller or equal than the expected net present
value of prots generated by hiring the worker, reduces to
K + "it  1 + r
r + 
(y   wit) (73)
The wage wit will depend on individual training costs as well as aggregate productivity
in period t when the worker was hired and the Nash bargain took place, as can be seen by
combining equations (18), (19) and (20) for random hiring, and equation (19) and wit =
wFR ("it) for selective hiring, see section 5.2. Both with random and with selective hiring, the
wage rule is linear in "it and yt.
wit = 
0 + 
""it + 
yy (74)
where the coe¢ cients 
0, 
" and 
y will be di¤erent for random versus selective hiring
and will depend on model parameters and endogenous variables, in particular ~", but will be
constant across individuals.
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Now suppose that in addition to heterogeneity in training costs, "it  G, workers also
di¤er in their productivity, yit  F . We assume that once a match is started, productivity
is xed for the duration of the match. Then, with heterogeneous productivity, job creation
condition (73) changes to,
K + "it  1 + r
r + 
(yit   wit) (75)
where wit = 
0 + 
""it + 
yyit analogous to (74).
It is straightforward to see that (75) can be rewritten as
K + "0it 
1 + r
r + 
(y   wit) (76)
where wit = 
0 + 
""0it + 
yy and
"0it = "it +
(1 + r) (1  
y)
r + + (1 + r) 
"
(yit   y) (77)
so that heterogeneous productivity can be rephrased as heterogeneous training costs.
We conclude that we can learn all there is to learn from a model with heterogeneous
productivity also from a model with heterogeneous training costs. As a corollary, we argue
that while correlation between yit and "it is important, in the sense that it a¤ects the variation
in "0it, it does not matter for the predictions of the model conditional on "
0
it. For example, if
yit and "it are positively correlated, then "0it will be less dispersed than "it (and vice versa if
they are negatively correlated), but once we calibrate the variance of the distribution of "0it
to its true value, the predictions of this model will be the same as the predictions of a model
with homogeneous productivity and "it = "0it.
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Figure 1. Unemployment Insurance with Random Hiring,  = 1
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Figure 2. Unemployment Insurance with Random Hiring,  = 0:5
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Figure 3. Unemployment Insurance with Selective Hiring
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